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Abstract 
This paper examines the recent commercialisation of the programme-making activities at 
the BBC in the UK as a major instance of a wider tendency that sees a market logic 
becoming increasingly embedded in public service media (PSM) organisations. Drawing 
on ideational approaches to policy analysis, this paper seeks to explain how and why the 
BBC came to conceive of BBC Studios, a new commercial subsidiary bringing together 
the majority of BBC’s in-house production units and free to compete in the wider market 
for programme commissions, as serving its long-term interests. It considers how BBC 
strategists engaged with dominant ideas in UK broadcasting policy on the economic 
value of the creative industries and the benefits of competition for creativity in television 
programme-making. It shows how changes to the institutional context over the past three 
decades, predicated on these very ideas, have constrained BBC’s room for manoeuvre. 
The main arguments put forward – the BBC’s growing reliance on economic arguments 
to justify its value and the path-dependent effects at work pushing the BBC towards 
advocating an institutional solution entailing the further hollowing out of its publicly-
funded structures – are relevant to wider debates on the future role and organisational 
forms of PSM. 
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Introduction 
Facing budget cuts and operating within an expanding and ever-more 
complex media environment populated by a growing number of commercial 
rivals, suppliers and distributors, public service media (PSM) around the world 
are striving to remain fit-fir-purpose by adopting new organisational models 
(see, e.g., Lowe and Berg, 2013). The solutions being adopted often entail the 
growing embedding of a commercial logic in their core operations. Non-
commercialism has always been a difficult distinction to maintain for PSM 
organisations  (see Moe, 2013; Cunningham and Flew, 2014). Many of these 
organisations have long supplemented the funding they receive from the state 
with income derived from either selling advertising or engaging in various 
ancillary commercial activities. Since the 1990s, however, PSM have arguably 
become integrated more deeply into the market. Several dimensions to this 
process can be identified, including the outsourcing of the programme-making 
function to private-sector suppliers and the more aggressive pursuit of 
commercial revenues in secondary and international markets to make up for 
declining public funding. Although the strategic and financial rationales behind 
these instances of PSM’s encounters with the market are obvious enough, 
there are questions as to whether the growing encroachment of a market logic 
into PSM’s core operations is in tension with the fulfilment of their public 
service remit and can ultimately undermine their distinctiveness and thus their 
very reason for being. 
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Against this backdrop, this paper examines the recent commercialisation 
of the programme-making activities at the BBC in the UK, the latest in a series 
of initiatives that have since the 1980s brought the BBC closer to the market 
(see Leys, 2001). In 2015, in the context of the negotiations with government 
for the renewal of its 10-year Royal Charter1, the BBC put forward a proposal 
to bring together its licence fee-funded programme-making departments 
under a new wholly-owned commercial subsidiary to be named BBC Studios. 
They new entity would operate freely in the market for commissions from 
third-party broadcasters. At the same time the BBC pledged to outsource to 
external private-sector production companies a much greater proportion of the 
programmes it commissions. These proposals were described as ‘arguably 
the biggest shakeup ever to the way [the BBC] operates’ (Conlan, 2015). 
The analytical perspective adopted here is one that seeks to understand 
how the BBC as a strategic actor operating within a ‘densely structured 
context’ (Hay 2002: 213) came to conceive of the BBC Studios strategy as 
serving its long-term interests. Given the harsh financial realities faced by the 
BBC at the time (more on which below), the move to commercialise its in-
house programme-making structures could appear as a ‘no-brainer’ at first 
glance. Setting up BBC Studios as a separate commercial entity would allow 
the BBC to get off its books the salary of around 2,000 in-house producers as 
well as bringing in extra commercial income by opening up a new stream of 
revenues. However, a moment’s reflection suggests that things are not as 
simple as that. For, in the very words of the BBC, programme-making has 
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been ‘the beating heart of the BBC throughout its existence’ (BBC, 2015a: 8). 
Turning this core activity into a commercially-run operation is another big step 
towards the blurring of BBC’s ‘publicness’. One of its unintended 
consequences could well be to undermine in the long-term BBC’s case for 
retaining exclusive access to the TV licence fee (a tax levied on all TV 
households) against persisting arguments that this money should be made 
available to commercial broadcasters on a contestable basis (see Donders 
and Raats, 2015). From other perspectives too, BBC Studios could be seen 
as a self-defeating move. Question marks were raised over the commercial 
viability of BBC Studios, given that its salary costs at launch would be 
significantly higher than the sector-average and profitability was hence 
predicated on BBC Studios winning a large number of commissions. 
However, if the new commercial venture proved to be successful, the BBC 
then would likely face charges of market distortion and calls for the sell-off of 
BBC Studios to private investors. Finally, concerns were also voiced over the 
negative impact, if the BBC were to start to produce programmes for its 
commercial competitors, on public perceptions of the BBC brand’s universality 
and distinctiveness. 
Answering why the BBC came to see the BBC Studios strategy as serving 
its long-term interests is, then, not as straightforward as it might initially 
appear. Addressing this question requires adopting a theoretical perspective 
that sensitizes the analyst to the perceptual nature of interests and the 
centrality of ideas to an understanding of the relationship between actors and 
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the context in which their strategy is forged. As it will be discussed in the next 
section setting out the theoretical framework, Colin Hay’s ‘constructivist 
institutionalism’ fits the bill. Drawing on documentary evidence, the remainder 
of the paper first outlines the background to the BBC Studios strategy and, 
then, seeks to make sense of it by tracing its origin in major ideational shifts 
and institutional developments unfolding from the 1980s onwards and by 
examining how the BBC sought to harness the energy of dominant ideas in 
UK broadcasting policy to promote what it saw, given the circumstances, as 
favourable policy outcomes for the next Charter period. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This study is situated theoretically within approaches to political analysis that 
see policy-making as a struggle over the interpretation of policy problems, for 
social reality (in keeping with a social constructivist ontology) is presumed to 
be neither directly nor unambiguously accessible to actors (Fischer, 1998). 
This is an intuitive and yet important theoretical insight. As put by Craig 
Parsons (2015: 446), the basic claim is that ‘how actors think about policy 
matters, and their thinking is not just a mechanistic function of uninterpreted 
conditions around them’. A focus on ideas, it is contended, provides ‘richer 
explanations of politics’, for ‘ideas shape how we understand political 
problems, give definition to our goals and strategies, and are the currency we 
use to communicate about politics’ (Béland and Cox, 2011: 3). 
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An important strand of ideational scholarship within political science has 
emerged out of new-institutionalism, a broad approach to the study of policy-
making that, at the most basic level, seek ‘to elucidate the role that institutions 
play in the determination of social and political outcomes’ (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 936). Institutional arguments tend to be structural for they see 
institutions (broadly understood as the formal and informal rules of a polity) as 
external constraints that shape human behaviour and political outcomes. Yet, 
within new-institutionalism there has been a turn to ideas in recent times in 
order to explain phenomena that, it was felt, a focus on institutions alone 
could not explain. So much so that a new variant of new-institutionalism, 
variously labelled as ideational, discursive or constructivist institutionalism 
(see Hay, 2001, 2006; Schmidt, 2008, 2011) has claimed its distinctiveness 
from the three older ones (rational choice, sociological and historical 
institutionalism). According to one of the main proponents, its distinctiveness 
lies in the fact that while more conventional approaches to institutional 
analysis, notably historical institutionalism, see institutions primarily as 
constitutive of ideas, this newer new-institutionalism sees ‘ideas as 
constitutive of institutions even if shaped by them’ (Schmidt, 2011: 53). From 
this perspective, then, ‘ideas are the foundation of institutions’ and are 
embedded in their design and development (Béland and Cox, 2011: 9). 
Here I draw in particular on Colin Hay’s ‘constructivist institutionalism’ 
(see Hay, 2002, 2006, 2011). Hay sees actors (whether individual or 
collective) as being broadly purposeful and strategic, ‘seeking to realize 
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certain complex, contingent, and constantly changing goals’ (Hay, 2006: 63). 
The social constructivism of Hay’s constructivist institutionalism is most 
apparent in his treatment of interests (see in particular Hay, 2011). Rather 
than being materially given as in positivist accounts of political phenomena, 
interests are seen by Hay as being discursively constituted. Actors’ perceived 
interests are thus not a direct representation of their material interests. In the 
words of Vivien Schmidt (2011: 58), another leading exponent of this strand of 
new-institutionalism, ‘interests cannot be separated from ideas about 
interests’ and are best understood ‘as subjective responses to material 
conditions’. Rather than a given, interests are then taken by discursive 
institutionalists as ‘their subject of inquiry’ (Schmidt, 2011: 58) – the 
explanandum. The strategies that actors pursue (and the interests informing 
those strategies) are, as Hay puts it, ‘irremediably a perceptual matter’ (Hay, 
2002: 194) for actors cannot be assumed to be blessed with perfect 
information about the context in which they find themselves, and hence ‘they 
must rely on perceptions of that context that are, at best, incomplete and that 
might often prove to have been inaccurate after the event’ (Hay, 2006: 63). 
It follows logically from this that within such a theoretical construct ideas 
are granted a crucial space. Understood as cognitive or normative beliefs, 
ideas provide ‘the point of mediation between actors and their environment’ 
(Hay, 2002: 209-210). Context and conduct (and thus the material and the 
ideational) are dialectically related. On the one hand, the context is selective 
of strategy, ‘in the sense that, given a specific context, only certain courses of 
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strategic action are available to actors and only some of these are likely to 
see actors realise their intentions’ (Hay, 2002: 209). The context also places 
constraints upon the discursive constructions of the context (that is, upon the 
ideas we hold about it). This is because ‘for particular ideas, narratives and 
paradigms to continue to provide cognitive templates through which actors 
interpret the world, they must retain a certain resonance with those actors’ 
direct and mediated experience’ (Hay, 2002: 212).  
However, the direction of influence is two-way. For if ‘it is the ideas that 
actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the 
context itself which informs the way in which actors behave’ (Hay and 
Rosamund, 2002: 148), then through the strategic action they inform, ideas 
(no matter how ill-informed), ‘exert their own effect upon the development of 
the context over time’ (Hay, 2002: 214). Hay illustrates this central point in his 
theoretical construct by considering the material effects (cuts to corporate 
taxes) produced by dominant (but empirically challenged) discursive 
constructions of globalisation as an external economic constraint with 
attendant political imperatives (Hay and Rosamund, 2002). The conclusion, 
supportive of the claim that ‘ideas matter’, is that ‘whether the globalization 
thesis is “true” or not may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true 
(or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it’ (Hay and Rosamund, 
2002: 148). 
At this point, however, the question arises as to how actors come to think 
what they think. Hay’s answer is to acknowledge both ‘ideational agency’ and 
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‘ideational structures’ (providing actors with cognitive and normative filters 
through which they come to see the world). Actors operate within the terms of 
the political discourse prevailing at any given time and place, lending greater 
legitimacy to certain social interests over others and shaping what actors 
perceive to be ‘feasible, legitimate, possible, and desirable’ (Hay, 2006: 65). 
However, in a move that tempers the structuralism of this position, Hay 
acknowledges that ‘it is actors, after all, who fashion understandings and offer 
legitimations of their conduct, even if they do so in discursive circumstances 
which are not of their own choosing’ (Hay and Rosamund, 2002: 151). 
Finally, it is important to note that a theoretical perspective that rejects the 
notion of material interests and accords ideas a more central role in 
explanations of political outcomes is not at odds with one that concedes that 
actors may appeal to ideas disingenuously in order to legitimise policies 
pursued for quite distinct ends. This eventuality is consistent with the notion 
that ideas ‘matters’. Glossing over the methodological problems in seeking to 
establish whether the public statements of political actors reflect their genuine 
beliefs, Hay argues that ideas matter not only when they are genuinely held 
by actors but also in situations likely to be characterized by actors’ strategic 
appeal to ideas, for appealing to certain ideas, as in the illustration of the 
globalisation thesis, can render politically more viable policies that might not 
otherwise be deemed legitimate (Hay and Rosamund, 2002: 165). 
As a framework for analysis, Hay’s constructivist institutionalism 
sensitizes the analyst to the dialectical relationship between the material and 
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the ideational, to the perceptual nature of interests and strategy, to the 
mediating role of ideas and their institutional embedding. Informed by this 
theoretical understanding, the paper will examine how the BBC as a strategic 
actor seeking to secure its future in the next Charter period on the most 
possible favourable terms accessed the ‘densely structured context’ (Hay 
2002: 213) in which it found itself. Before doing that, however, the next 
section outlines the BBC Studios Strategy in greater detail and considers it in 
relation to the core funding issues faced by the BBC. 
 
 
The BBC Studios Strategy in Context 
In the last thirty years, funding, more than governance, has arguably been the 
main battleground for the BBC in the fight to secure its future. (For historical 
accunts of UK broadcasting policy see, among others, Goodwin [1998]; Hardy 
[2012]; Potscha [2012]). BBC strategists have conceded ground on the issue 
of how the BBC should be held politically accountable (its system of 
governance having undergone several changes in recent times in the 
direction of placing the BBC under ever closer external scrutiny). However, on 
the issue of funding they have tried to hold the line. Securing the continuation 
of the licence fee on the most favourable possible terms has been a central 
plank of BBC’s strategy at least since the Peacock Committee, appointed by 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1986 to advise on the future funding of 
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the BBC, recommended that the UK television system should move in the 
long run to a subscription-based funding model. As a corollary to this strategy, 
the BBC has also firmly opposed periodically resurfacing proposals to turn the 
licence fee into a contestable scheme, claiming exclusive access to this 
source of income (Donders and Rats, 2015). The BBC’s 1992 Royal Charter 
manifesto stated that ‘the licence fee will remain the most appropriate way of 
funding the BBC’s core services’ (BBC, 1992: 66). Ten years later, in the 
subsequent round of Charter renewal, the same conclusion was reached: ‘the 
licence fee funding remains the best way of paying for the BBC for the 
foreseeable future’ and ‘the superficial attractions of competition for licence 
fee funding are heavily outweighed by its drawbacks’ (BBC, 2004: 112). Thus, 
central to BBC’s sense of its own self-interest has been the preference 
accorded to the licence fee as a mechanism to finance its core services over 
alternatives such as subscription – a position that has so far continued to 
command sufficiently large support across the political spectrum.  
There has been, however, another major plank in BBC’s funding strategy. 
Ever since the early 1990s, the BBC has sought to supplement the licence fee 
with commercial revenues generated primarily through the exploitation of 
BBC’s intellectual property (IP) in secondary and international markets. The 
BBC has justified this strategy on the ground that its commercial activities 
maximise the value of the licence fee investment in programmes, and that any 
profits generated are re-invested in its public service activities for the ultimate 
benefit of licence fee payers. The bulk of BBC’s commercial income is 
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generated by BBC Worldwide, a wholly-owned commercial subsidiary running 
subscription-based channels both domestically and internationally and selling 
BBC TV programmes around the world. Though successful in securing the 
continuation of the licence fee scheme, for most of the past three decades the 
BBC has experienced a decrease in real-value terms in the level of the 
licence fee. Commercial activities have thus come to be seen by the BBC as 
providing a much-needed source of extra income. Successive governments 
have endorsed and in fact openly encouraged the BBC to grow commercial 
revenues, especially through international activities (Steemers, 2001). In turn, 
a fast-growing and globalising media market has provided the BBC 
(leveraging its international reputation) plenty of commercial opportunities to 
do so.  
During 2014, under the new leadership of Director-General Tony Hall, the 
BBC began to unveil its strategy for the next Charter period (2017-2027). On 
the question of funding, the BBC’s position had not changed. The licence fee 
was still seen as the best mechanism to finance the BBC’s core public service 
activities. The BBC also continued to regard the ability to generate 
commercial revenues as vital, given the unlikelihood of any future government 
according the BBC a generous increase in the level of public funding. Indeed, 
within weeks of winning the general elections of May 2015, the incoming 
Conservative government imposed a harsh licence fee settlement on the BBC 
for the five-year period from 2017/18, entailing a cut in real-value terms of 
around 10 per cent in the BBC budget (BBC, 2015: 88). 
	 13 
This is the context in which the BBC Studios strategy came into being. 
The idea was first floated by BBC Director-General Tony Hall in a speech at 
City University in July 2014 (Hall, 2014; see also Hall, 2015). Professing a 
strong belief in the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and in competition as a force for 
good, Hall launched what he described as a ‘competition revolution’ at the 
BBC, a key element of which was a pledge to introduce ‘proper competition in 
programme supply’ by lowering the existing guarantee threshold for BBC’s in-
house productions (more on which below), as part of a wider ‘compete or 
compare’ strategy designed to improve BBC’s efficiency and deliver greater 
value for money. Importantly, in exchange for offering external producers 
greater opportunities to compete for BBC programming slots, Hall argued that 
BBC producers should be allowed in future to pitch ideas not just to the BBC 
(as under the existing framework) but also to third-party commissioners. Only 
then, he contended, a level playing field would be created and the full benefits 
of competition realised.  
The plan to set up BBC Studios as a commercial subsidiary was spelled 
out in BBC Studios: Strengthening the BBC’s Role in the Creative Industries 
(BBC, 2015a), published in September 2015 shortly after the release of the 
government’s Green Paper on the BBC setting in motion the Charter review 
process (DCMS, 2015). The BBC sought approval for a plan to merge the 
majority of BBC in-house production units (excluding news, current affairs, 
sports and children’s, which would all remain within the publicly-funded 
corporation) into BBC Studios, a new wholly-owned commercial subsidiary 
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operating in the wider market for programme commissions from broadcasters 
(and online video providers) in the UK and around the world. Any profit 
generated by the new commercial venture would be returned to the BBC and 
used to fund BBC’s public service activities. In what was openly presented as 
a quid-pro-quo, the BBC also confirmed its pledge to open up around 80% of 
the BBC’s overall TV network slate to competition from external suppliers 
(excluding news, current affairs, sports and children’s)2.  
The report argued that the set up of BBC Studios in tandem with the 
lowering of the BBC in-house guarantee would help ‘sustain the flow of new 
British talent, creativity and story-telling in a global supply market’ (BBC, 
2015a: 9) an thus be beneficial to BBC’s audiences and licence fee payers as 
well as to the UK creative industries. The proposal was ‘at its heart’ about 
‘greater creative freedom, with fewer caps on creative ambition for internal 
and external producers’ and ‘greater competition, building on the growth and 
vibrancy of the UK creative industries’ (BBC, 2015: 9). 
The BBC Studios strategy was in essence BBC’s response to the problem 
of how to reinvigorate its struggling in-house operations. ‘Maintaining a vibrant 
wholly-owned production unit’ (BBC, 2015a: 7) was identified as an essential 
condition in order for the BBC to be able to continue to operate successful in 
commercial markets. For, as stated in the BBC Studios report, BBC in-house 
productions provide ‘BBC’s only source of wholly-owned intellectual property, 
which is the engine of BBC Worldwide and generates significant financial 
returns for licence fee payers’ (BBC, 2015a: 5).  
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Regulatory changes since the early 2000s had contributed to weakening 
the position of BBC in-house productions. Under the Communications Act 
2003, external suppliers were allowed to hold on to more of the IP to the 
programmes commissioned from the BBC (more on which in the next 
section). Then in 2007, a system known as the Window of Creative 
Competition (WoCC), opening more of BBC’s commissioning spend to 
competition from external suppliers, had come into effect. Under the new 
system, BBC in-house productions were guaranteed 50% of BBC’s television 
commissions each year (excluding news and repeats); 25% was reserved, as 
it had been since 1990, to ‘qualifying’ independents (i.e., production 
companies not owned by groups with UK broadcasting interests); from now 
on, however, the remaining 25% of BBC commissioning hours, previously 
effectively going to the in-house teams, would be set aside for competition 
between in-house and ‘external’ producers – both qualifying and non-
qualifying (i.e., vertically-integrated companies). Ever since coming into effect 
in 2007, external suppliers have consistently won the majority of BBC’s 
contestable commissions in the WoCC and their share has grown over the 
years (from 72% in 2010/11 up to 78% of WoCC hours in 2014/15). 
In a White Paper unveiled in May 2016, the government provided ‘in-
principle support’ for the BBC Studios proposals subject to ‘them passing the 
appropriate regulatory tests and requirements’ (DCMS, 2016: 83). The White 
Paper, however, went further than what the BBC had proposed by urging it to 
introduce a system of full competition for its commissioning, thus 
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recommending that the BBC’s in-house guarantee be removed across all 
genres, with now the only exception of news and news-related current affairs. 
The government’s recommendations were arguably the culmination of a 
process that started in the 1980s, involving, similarly to the experience of 
other UK public services, the growing hollowing out of BBC’s publicly-funded 
structures and the growing encroachment of a market logic into its core 
operations. Tellingly, this latest change to BBC’s institutional framework 
originated from a BBC’s own proposal. As discussed, both BBC Studios and 
the new ‘compete or compare’ approach were core planks of the BBC’s 
strategy ahead of the start of negotiations with government for the Charter 
renewal 
Given the theoretical perspective adopted here, one that emphasizes the 
perceptual nature of interests and strategy, it is important to note that there 
were alternatives to the BBC Studios strategy available to the BBC. 
Conceivably, BBC strategists could have sought to keep the BBC’s in-house 
production units within the publicly-funded corporation and called for the 
government to maintain the status quo or even raise the in-house guarantee 
above the existing 50% level. In order to win support from government, the 
BBC could have pointed to industry consolidation in the television production 
sector and increased foreign ownership and vertical integration between 
broadcasters and producers (see next section). The BBC could have then 
built a plausible case that these trends were contributing to a gradual 
rebalancing of market power in the independents’ favour vis-à-vis 
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broadcasters thereby weakening the main public interest rationale for the 
WoCC.  
In order to explain why the BBC Studios strategy was preferred over this 
alternative, the next section turns to a consideration of the wider ideational 
and institutional context within which the BBC Studios strategy must be 
situated, drawing on the theoretical framework outlined earlier. It considers 
how the BBC as a strategic actor engaged with the context in which it found 
itself, a context shaped by three decades of ‘market-driven politics’ (Leys, 
2001) and shows that there were strong path-dependent effects at work that 
came to delimit the realm of what the BBC conceivably saw as politically 
feasible.	
 
o jskdjs 
Ideas, Institutions and the BBC as a Strategic Actor 
The radical restructuring of programme-making as a function within the UK 
television industry value chain needs to be seen as part of the wider process 
of marketization of the entire television system underway since the 1980s 
(Leys, 2001; Freedman, 2008). The context within which this process has 
unfolded has been one characterised by dramatic technological change 
unleashing global market forces on the one hand and by the ascendancy of 
neo-liberalism as the dominant political ideology on the other. It is argued 
here that three policy ideas in particular are central to understanding the 
context within which the restructuring of programme-making has taken place 
	 18 
and with which the BBC has had to strategically engage in seeking to secure 
its position in the next Charter period. First is the argument that as a major 
policy intervention in the market the BBC inhibits or ‘crowds out’ private 
investment. The second idea singles out the ‘creative industries’ as a key 
engine of growth for the whole of the UK economy. Third is a belief in 
competition as a driver for creativity and innovation in television programme-
making. These ideas are arguably all part of a neo-liberal Weltanschauung 
underpinning the marked-driven policies that have shaped this policy domain 
since the 1980s. As it shall be discussed in this section, they have been 
influential for they have underpinned changes to the regulatory framework and 
institutional setting of UK television in the last thirty years. They have thus 
become normalised and institutionalized, framing the parameters of the 
politically feasible and desirable. 
The idea that BBC ‘crowds out commercial investment’ has become 
over time the most common argument voiced by commercial rivals and free-
market advocates against the Corporation. In the first phase of UK 
broadcasting marketization in the 1980s and 1990s, pro-market arguments 
were primarily framed in terms of commercial media widening consumer 
choice and heralding a new era of consumer sovereignty thereby rendering 
public service broadcasting obsolete. This was against the backdrop of what 
was then a fast growing and financially thriving domestic commercial sector. 
Since the early 2000s, however, in the context of a maturing industry and a 
more financially challenging environment, the main argument has been 
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reframed into one portraying the BBC as too powerful within the domestic 
market, and hence exerting an adverse impact on private competitors by 
hampering their commercial growth and reducing their financial returns. The 
policy prescription, however, has remained very much the same: a scaled-
down BBC focussing on its core broadcasting activities, and on ‘market-
failure’ or ‘at-risk’ genres, its level of public funding reduced accordingly. 
The BBC has rejected the ‘crowding out’ argument by deploying three 
counter-arguments. First, in a number of reports the case was put forward that 
rather than ‘crowding out’ private investment high levels of public funding, as 
in the UK, set in motion a ‘race to the top’ between public and commercial 
broadcasters (BBC, 2013). Secondly, challenging the notion that it has 
become a sort of behemoth in the market, the BBC has been at pains to 
demonstrate that in relative terms, vis-à-vis transnational media groups and a 
new generation of mighty Internet companies (the likes of Google, Facebook 
and Netflix), its size has in fact decreased over the years. 
Most importantly, however, the BBC has urged to conceive of its market 
impact in a positive light. Starting in the early 2000s, it began to challenge 
increasingly widespread perceptions of its activities as inhibiting private sector 
expansion by placing growing emphasis on its enabling role in the growth of 
the wider creative sector. In doing so, it established a link with what had by 
then become a fashionable discourse on the creative economy. Under Tony 
Blair’s New Labour in the late 1990s, the sectors that had traditionally been 
referred to as the ‘cultural industries’, namely broadcasting, film, publishing 
	 20 
and recorded music, were submerged together with the arts into the ‘creative 
industries’, a new policy category encompassing a wide range of other 
activities, from to architecture to fashion, from software design to related 
computer services. The creative industries, thus broadly conceived, were 
singled out by New Labour as key growth driver for the UK economy as a 
whole. The subsuming of the media and the arts within the creative industry 
policy contributed to the growing influence of discourses emphasizing the 
economic as opposed the cultural and democratic contributions of the media 
and the cultural sectors (on New Labour’s creative industries policy see 
Garnham, 2005; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2014). 
In BBC’s 2004 Charter manifesto, Building Public Value (BBC 2004), 
economic value was identified as one component of the broader notion of 
‘public value’. The BBC claimed to make a positive contribution to the wider 
media economy ‘through its creative investment, its stability of funding 
through fluctuating economic cycles and its risk-taking’ (BBC, 2004: 40). First 
and foremost, it was noted in the report, the BBC is a leading investor in the 
UK’s creative economy investing in 2003 almost £1bn in the creative 
industries, including over £300m spent with external producers. The BBC 
further claimed that its positive impact on the wider media economy far 
outweighed the negative ‘impact it might have in reducing audiences for some 
commercial services’, thus producing ‘a strongly positive net contribution to 
the commercial health of the UK media sector’ (BBC, 2004: 41).  
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By 2015, these economic arguments found a noticeably more prominent 
place within BBC’s public statements. Tellingly, the two key policy documents 
produced by the BBC in the context of the negotiations for the renewal of its 
Royal Charter in 2015 carried the words ‘creative’ and ‘creative industries’ in 
their respective titles (BBC, 2015b, 2015a). And while in Building Public Value 
the BBC had felt it necessary to clarify that contribution to the economic 
health of the UK should rightly not be seen as the BBC’s primary goal, which 
is ‘to serve people as individuals and as citizens’ (2004: 40), in British Bold 
and Creative ten years later it placed the creative industries discourse centre 
stage from the outset. The Director-General’s preface to the report framed the 
key issue at stake in the renewal of BBC’s Royal Charter as one of making 
the right choices so that ‘Britain can have a BBC that excels globally—a BBC 
that is a powerhouse for creative and economic growth for the whole of the 
United Kingdom’ (BBC, 2015b: 4). A central plank of British Bold and Creative 
was then to demonstrate the positive economic impact of the BBC. The 
manifesto cited a study commissioned to PricewaterhouseCoopers modelling 
the impact on the creative sector of licence fee investment. The study had 
concluded that ‘for every £1 increase in licence fee revenue, the BBC would 
generate about 60p of extra economic value’ (BBC, 2015b: 98). Updating the 
figures cited in Building Public Value, the BBC reported that it had invested 
around £2.2bn of licence fee income directly in the creative sector in 2013/14, 
£1.2bn of which outside the BBC, and around £450m in small and micro-sized 
creative businesses. It concluded that ‘investment in the BBC is investment in 
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Britain’s creative industries’ (BBC, 2015b: 7) and that ‘less BBC spend means 
a smaller creative industry’ (BBC, 2015b: 98). 
The third policy idea that is essential in order to understand the context 
within which the BBC Studios strategy was conceived is the idea that market 
competition – more specifically, the outsourcing of broadcasters’ programme-
making function to external suppliers – stimulates creativity and innovation in 
programme-making (as well as delivering better value for money). This idea 
has become over time a common-sense assumption in policy circles and has 
largely gone unchallenged. Major institutional and regulatory changes in UK 
broadcasting policy implemented since the early 1980s have been predicated 
upon it. The introduction in 1982 of Channel 4 as a ‘publisher-broadcaster’ 
with no in-house production capacity of its own ‘was an important first step in 
fostering the development of a fledgling independent television production 
sector’ (Doyle and Paterson, 2008: 19). Whereas the creation of Channel 4 
was primarily motivated by a desire to promote cultural diversity and serve 
minority tastes, competition and industrial policy goals featured more 
prominently in subsequent policy interventions, which further strengthened the 
position of the independent television production sector vis-à-vis 
broadcasters. The Broadcasting Act of 1990 introduced a 25% quota for 
‘qualifying independents’ at the BBC and ITV further raising levels of market 
demand for programmes produced externally to the vertically-integrated 
broadcasters. The arrival of Channel 4 and the 25% independent production 
quota led to the rapid development of a sector that, by the mid-1990s, was 
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comprised of around 800 independent television production companies, 
mostly small or medium-sized enterprises (Doyle and Paterson, 2008: 21). 
Contextually, PACT, the trade association representing the interests of the 
‘indies’, established itself as powerful institutional actor within the 
broadcasting policy arena. In particular, PACT was instrumental in securing 
improved terms of trade with broadcasters in 2003. This was a major lobbying 
success, giving ‘qualifying’ independent producers greater control over the 
exploitation of the rights to their programmes in international markets, and 
contributing to the rapid growth of the sector and to a long cycle of 
consolidation, vertical integration and international acquisitions over the next 
decade, during which time a small number of ‘super-indies’ emerged and 
several were subsequently acquired by major global media companies, mainly 
from the US (see, e.g., Chalaby, 2010; Esser, 2016) 3. As already mentioned, 
the introduction in 2007 of the WoCC at the BBC, allowing external 
companies to compete for a further 25% of the BBC’s commissioning hours, 
was the latest in a series of regulatory changes designed to boost the 
independent production sector (Nicoli, 2012). 
In 2005, the Work Foundation was asked by the BBC to assess the likely 
impact of the proposed WoCC on BBC in-house production, also in light of the 
new terms of trade between broadcasters and producers and wider market 
trends (growing consolidation within the sector). The report warned that at 
some point in the next decade the BBC was likely to reach ‘a tipping point at 
which it will find it very difficult to justify in-house production capacity on even 
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its reduced relative scale’ (Work Foundation, 2005: 7). It painted a bleak 
picture: 
  
The BBC risks a serious hollowing-out as a creative organisation by a rapidly growing 
and newly empowered independent sector who will be obliged to poach its talent 
because of the paucity of its own training, while driving a hard bargain over both 
programme provision and re-use of content in service provision. The independents will 
increasingly dictate the terms over what kind of programmes they want to make within 
the quota and WoCC constraints (i.e., low-risk programmes in long-run formats), so 
that an important section of BBC output will look indistinguishable – despite its claims 
for public value creation – from other commercial channels (Work Foundation, 2005: 7) 
 
The report urged the BBC to resist these trends, but it argued that ‘that is 
exactly what the current architecture is disabling it from doing’ (Work 
Foundation, 2005: 8). For the BBC to maintain in-house production at a critical 
mass of capacity, the report recommended that greater regulatory safeguards 
for BBC in-house production be introduced.  
In the following decade, the BBC tried (somewhat timidly) to make the 
case that it should be allowed to retain more IP either by producing more in-
house or through more favourable terms of trade with independents. 
However, the political tide was moving very much in the opposite direction. 
Since the coming into effects of the WoCC, PACT vociferously called for the 
BBC to open up more of its commissioning slots to external suppliers – its 
ultimate vision being that of a BBC turned ‘publisher broadcaster’, on Channel 
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4’s model (Oliver and Ohlbaum, 2014). The success of external suppliers in 
securing the majority of commissioning hours in the 25% WoCC boosted 
PACT’s case, for PACT could argue that a point had been reached at which 
BBC’s 50% in-house guarantee was effectively ‘acting as a barrier to further 
creative competition’ (Sara Geater, PACT, cited in WMF, 2015: 11). 
By 2014, a government-mandated reduction of BBC’s in-house guarantee 
looked a very likely prospect. PACT’s case was received with sympathy in 
policy circles and the idea that competition and outsourcing drive creativity in 
television production, in spite of inconclusive results of research on the 
determinants of organisational creativity (see, e.g., Lee, 2011), went largely 
unquestioned, except for few voices4. Harnessing the energy of that idea 
(while at the same time leveraging the creative industries discourse), BBC 
Director-General Tony Hall then promised ‘a competition revolution’ at the 
BBC, calling for ‘a less regulated system’ in order to create ‘a level playing-
field between BBC producers and independent ones’ (Hall, 2014). In order to 
achieve this, Hall argued, BBC producers should be allowed to pitch their 
ideas outside the corporation, for the problem for the BBC under a system of 
‘managed competition’ was that ‘BBC Production has only one buyer – BBC 
Commissioning – which inevitably constrains its opportunities’. More 
importantly, Hall went on, it had become difficult for the BBC to retain talented 
people moving to the more lucrative commercial sector, people ‘who grew up 
with the BBC but who now feel they have the freedom to be more creative and 
competitive elsewhere’. 
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Tony Hall’s 2014 speech is strongly suggestive of the internalisation of a 
pro-market and pro-competition ideology at BBC’s top management level. The 
alternative course of action – to keep BBC production departments within the 
publicly-funded corporation and to call for the status quo or for even greater 
regulatory safeguards to BBC in-house production (as recommended by the 
Work Foundation ten years earlier) – was seen as politically a non-starter. 
The opening up of BBC’s spend to external suppliers also chimed with the ‘big 
idea’ put forward by the BBC in its 2015 Charter manifesto – that of ‘an open 
BBC’, a BBC which would become ‘Britain’s creative partner’ and ‘a platform 
for this country’s incredible talent’ (BBC, 2015b: 6) so that ‘that the investment 
in the licence fee is not just an investment in the BBC’ (BBC, 2015b: 55). 
Supporting ‘a thriving independent production sector’ was the clearest 
illustration of how, the report claimed, this was already happening (BBC, 
2015b: 55). 
 
Conclusion 
Ever since the 1980s, UK broadcasting policy has arguably been informed by 
a market-conforming notion of public service broadcasting. In the words of 
Des Freedman (2008: 169), the BBC has come to be seen ‘not as an 
autonomous proponent of public service values but as an organisation that is 
part of an increasingly competitive, marketised environment and needs 
regulating according to that logic’. As discussed, one prominent aspect of the 
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wider process of marketization in this sector has been the gradual hollowing 
out of BBC’s in-house production and the outsourcing of the programme-
making function to a fast-growing independent production industry that in 
recent years has consolidated, falling in the hands of transnational media 
groups. Arguably, the move to open up the majority of BBC’s commissioning 
hours to competition from external suppliers (running counter the trend in the 
private sector of growing broadcaster-producer integration), and, relatedly, 
BBC’s plan to commercialise its programme-making operations under the 
BBC Studios banner, are the culmination of a 30-year-long process. This 
paper has examined how the BBC as a strategic actor has engaged with 
dominant ideas in UK broadcasting policy in a bid to preserve its position in 
the next Charter period. The BBC has countered the influential ‘crowding out’ 
argument by appealing to another fashionable discourse – on the creative 
economy. Portraying itself as ‘a great enabler for the creative industry’ (Hall, 
2015), the BBC has thus increasingly turned to economic arguments in order 
to justify its wider societal value, thereby validating a reductive, but 
increasingly accepted notion of the licence fee as an industrial policy tool – ‘a 
venture capital fund for creativity’ (Work Foundation, 2005: 6).  
Whether genuinely or quite possibly out of a strategic calculus, the BBC 
has also embraced another powerful discourse influencing the policies 
implemented in this domain since the 1980s – the idea that competition in 
television programme-making stimulates creativity. Drawing on Hay’s 
constructivist institutionalism, it was argued that changes to the institutional 
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context over the past three decades predicated on this idea created strong 
path-dependent effects constraining BBC’s room for manoeuvre. Conceiving 
of its long-term interests as best served by a strategy ensuring continuing 
control over IP in order to maximise returns from commercial activities in the 
face of real-value cuts to the licence fee, the BBC has embraced the idea that 
competition drives creativity in order to build the case for the set up of BBC 
Studios as a separate commercial entity free to compete with other production 
companies in the wider market for programme commissions. In tandem with 
the further opening up of BBC commissioning hours to the independent 
sector, this move was heralded by BBC Director-General (Hall, 2015) as 
marking the transition from an era of ‘managed competition’ to an era of full 
competition. Figure 1 below summarises the main argument of the paper. 
 
Figure 1: A diagrammatic representation of the main argument 
 
 ‘crowding	out’	argument	
	
	
	
	
	
à 	BBC’s	discursive	strategy:	*	Emphasis	on	economic	value	*	‘An	open	BBC’	(2015	Charter	manifesto)	
creative	industries	discourse	
	
	
	
	
	
	
à 	Institutionally-embedded	
idea:	*	Ch.4	publisher-broadcaster	(1982)	*	25%	indie	production	quota	(1990)	*	Improved	terms	of	trade	(2003)		*	BBC’s	WoCC	(2007)	*	A	fast-growing	independent	prod	sector	represented	by	a	highly	effective	lobbyist	(PACT) 
Competition	for	programme	supply	stimulates	creativity	
BBC		(strategic	actor)	 countering	 by	appealing	to	
embracing	
	
	
	
	
BBC’s	strategy	
BBC	Studios	(commercial	venture)	 Opening	up	of	commissioning	spend	
in	order	to	justify		
BBC’s	sense	of	self-interest:	maintaining	a	strong	in-house	production	unit	to	secure	control	of	IP		
im
plicating		
	 29 
 
The influence of a market-conforming notion of public service 
broadcasting resulted in a policy debate dominated by concerns voiced by 
PACT and other sections of the industry about the risks of market distortion 
posed by a commercially-operating BBC Studios with a focus on attendant 
issues of transparency, fair trading and cross-subsidies. By contrast, 
objections about the potentially negative impact on public service 
programming hardly figured at all. Some of the trade unions and media 
campaigning groups (VLV, Equity) as well as BBC’s main commercial rival, 
ITV (self-servingly no doubt) voiced concerns that a for-profit BBC Studios 
would face strong economic incentives to produce programmes with broad 
commercial and international appeal, which could jeopardise ‘the current non-
commercial policy benefits delivered by the BBC’s in house production 
activities’ (ITV, 2015: 12). Such concerns, however, were dismissed by Ofcom 
in its advice to government (Ofcom, 2015b: 15) and were ignored by the 
government in its White Paper of May 2016 endorsing the BBC Studios plan 
(DMCS, 2016).  
The set up of BBC Studios as a separate commercial entity and the move 
to a system of full competition for BBC’s commissioning spend (with the 
exclusion of news) is informed by a notion that equates PSM with the 
commissioning, over and above the making, of television programmes. This 
increasingly given-for-granted notion might well in future lend greater weight 
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to arguments (strongly opposed by the BBC) that licence fee money should 
become available to commercial broadcasters on a contestable basis.  
The two main arguments put forward in this paper – the BBC’s growing 
reliance on economic arguments to justify its value and the path-dependent 
effects pushing the BBC towards advocating an institutional solution entailing 
the further hollowing out of its publicly-funded structures – are likely to be 
relevant to wider debates on the future role and organisational forms of PSM, 
not the least because innovations in UK PSM policy have in the past 
transferred to other countries. 
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1 The BBC is established under a Royal Charter. The current Charter, the 
ninth in BBC’s history, came into effect on 1 January 2017 and will expire on 
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31 December 2027. The process for its renewal started in July 2015 with the 
release of the government’s Green Paper on the future of the BBC (DCMS, 
2015).	
2 Further, in December 2015, the BBC agreed to tender at least 40% of its 
returning in-house series by 2018 (instead of transferring them automatically 
to BBC Studios). This concession was made by the BBC to win support from 
the independent television production sector, initially hostile to the prospect of 
BBC Studios – ‘Britain’s first publicly owned mega indie’, in the words of Sara 
Geater from PACT, the industry trade association (WMF, 2015: 11) – entering 
its core market. 
3  In its 2015 review of the television production sector, Ofcom, the UK 
communications regulator, cited the following figures to highlight growing 
levels of consolidation: by 2014 the top ten producers accounted for an 
estimated 66% of all UK producer revenue, up from 45% in 2003; six of the 
ten largest producers were now owned by broadcasters; and seven of the ten 
largest UK producers had fallen under the ownership of large foreign media 
corporations (Ofcom, 2015a: 17). 
4  In her submission to BBC Trust’s review of BBC’s content supply 
arrangements, Sylvia Harvey, a scholar and campaigner, argued that ‘the 
culture of production, if nurtured in-house, can provide fertile ground for 
innovation, a reliable source of supply and critical engagement with the public 
purposes of the BBC – as well as the retention of IP value’ (Harvey, 2015: 2). 
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Other submissions from media advocacy groups (VLV) and sectoral unions 
(NJU) raised similar objections as well as concerns over the negative effects 
of outsourcing on investment in skills	 development and training, given the 
independent sector’s heavy reliance on freelancers. 
